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Abstract
Classifiers used in the wild, in particular for safety-
critical systems, should not only have good generaliza-
tion properties but also should know when they don’t
know, in particular make low confidence predictions far
away from the training data. We show that ReLU type
neural networks which yield a piecewise linear classi-
fier function fail in this regard as they produce almost
always high confidence predictions far away from the
training data. For bounded domains like images we
propose a new robust optimization technique similar
to adversarial training which enforces low confidence
predictions far away from the training data. We show
that this technique is surprisingly effective in reducing
the confidence of predictions far away from the training
data while maintaining high confidence predictions and
test error on the original classification task compared
to standard training.
1. Introduction
Neural networks have recently obtained state-of-the-
art performance in several application domains like ob-
ject recognition and speech recognition. They have be-
come the de facto standard for many learning tasks.
Despite this great success story and very good predic-
tion performance there are also aspects of neural net-
works which are undesirable. One property which is
naturally expected from any classifier is that it should
know when it does not know or said more directly:
far away from the training data a classifier should not
make high confidence predictions. This is particu-
larly important in safety-critical applications like au-
tonomous driving or medical diagnosis systems where
such an input should either lead to the fact that other
redundant sensors are used or that a human doctor is
asked to check the diagnosis. It is thus an important
property of a classifier which however has not received
much attention despite the fact that it seems to be a
minimal requirement for any classifier.
There have been many cases reported where high
confidence predictions are made far away from the
training data by neural networks, e.g. on fooling im-
ages [31], for out-of-distribution images [15] or in a
medical diagnosis task [23]. Moreover, it has been ob-
served that, even on the original task, neural networks
often produce overconfident predictions [12]. A related
but different problem are adversarial samples where
very small modifications of the input can change the
classifier decision [34, 11, 28]. Apart from methods
which provide robustness guarantees for neural net-
works [14, 37, 32, 26] which give still only reasonable
guarantees for small networks, up to our knowledge the
only approach which has not been broken again [6, 5, 2]
is adversarial training [25] using robust optimization
techniques.
While several methods have been proposed to adjust
overconfident predictions on the true input distribution
using softmax calibration [12], ensemble techniques [20]
or uncertainty estimation using dropout [10], only re-
cently the detection of out-of-distribution inputs [15]
has been tackled. The existing approaches basically ei-
ther use adjustment techniques of the softmax outputs
[9, 24] by temperature rescaling [12] or they use a gener-
ative model like a VAE or GAN to model boundary in-
puts of the true distribution [22, 36] in order to discrim-
inate in-distribution from out-of-distribution inputs di-
rectly in the training process. While all these ap-
proaches are significant steps towards obtaining more
reliable classifiers, the approaches using a generative
model have been recently challenged by [29, 16] which
report that generative approaches can produce highly
confident density estimates for inputs outside of the
class they are supposed to model. Moreover, note that
the quite useful models for confidence calibration on
the input distribution like [10, 12, 20] cannot be used
for out-of-distribution detection as it has been observed
in [23]. Another approach is the introduction of a rejec-
tion option into the classifier [35, 4], in order to avoid
decisions the classifier is not certain about.
In this paper we will show that for the class of ReLU
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networks, that are networks with fully connected, con-
volutional and residual layers, where just ReLU or
leaky ReLU are used as activation functions and max
or average pooling for convolution layers, basically any
neural network which results in a piecewise affine classi-
fier function, produces arbitrarily high confidence pre-
dictions far away from the training data. This implies
that techniques which operate on the output of the clas-
sifier cannot identify these inputs as out-of-distribution
inputs. On the contrary we formalize the well known
fact that RBF networks produce almost uniform confi-
dence over the classes far away from the training data,
which shows that there exist classifiers which satisfy
the minimal requirement of not being confident in areas
where one has never seen data. Moreover, we propose
a robust optimization scheme motivated by adversarial
training [25] which simply enforces uniform confidence
predictions on noise images which are by construction
far away from the true images. We show that our tech-
nique not only significantly reduces confidence on such
noise images, but also on other unrelated image clas-
sification tasks and in some cases even for adversarial
samples generated for the original classification task.
The training procedure is simple, needs no adaptation
for different out-of-distribution tasks, has similar com-
plexity as standard adversarial training and achieves
similar performance on the original classification task.
2. ReLU networks produce piecewise
affine functions
We quickly review in this section the fact that ReLU
networks lead to continuous piecewise affine classifiers,
see [1, 8], which we briefly summarize in order to set
the ground for our main theoretical result in Section 3.
Definition 2.1. A function f : Rd → R is called
piecewise affine if there exists a finite set of polytopes
{Qr}Mr=1 (referred to as linear regions of f) such that
∪Mr=1Qr = Rd and f is an affine function when re-
stricted to every Qr.
Feedforward neural networks which use piecewise
affine activation functions (e.g. ReLU, leaky ReLU)
and are linear in the output layer can be rewritten as
continuous piecewise affine functions [1]. This includes
fully connected, convolutional, residual layers and even
skip connections as all these layers are just linear map-
pings. Moreover, it includes further average pooling
and max pooling. More precisely, the classifier is a
function f : Rd → RK , where K are the number of
classes, such that each component fi : Rd → R, is a
continuous piecewise affine function and the K compo-
nents (fi)Ki=1 have the same set of linear regions. Note
that explicit upper bounds on the number of linear re-
gions have been given [27].
In the following we follow [8]. For simplicity we
just present fully connected layers (note that convolu-
tional layers are a particular case of them). Denote
by σ : R → R, σ(t) = max{0, t}, the ReLU acti-
vation function, by L + 1 the number of layers and
W (l) ∈ Rnl×nl−1 and b(l) ∈ Rnl respectively are the
weights and offset vectors of layer l, for l = 1, . . . , L+1
and n0 = d. For x ∈ Rd one defines g(0)(x) = x. Then
one can recursively define the pre- and post-activation
output of every layer as
f (k)(x) = W (k)g(k−1)(x) + b(k), and
g(k)(x) = σ(f (k)(x)), k = 1, . . . , L,
so that the resulting classifier is obtained as
f (L+1)(x) = W (L+1)g(L)(x) + b(L+1).
Let ∆(l),Σ(l) ∈ Rnl×nl for l = 1, . . . , L be diagonal
matrices defined elementwise as
∆(l)(x)ij =
{
sign(f (l)i (x)) if i = j,
0 else.
,
Σ(l)(x)ij =
{
1 if i = j and f (l)i (x) > 0,
0 else.
.
Note that for leaky ReLU the entries would be 1 and
α instead. This allows to write f (k)(x) as composition
of affine functions, that is
f (k)(x) =W (k)Σ(k−1)(x)
(
W (k−1)Σ(k−2)(x)
×
(
. . .
(
W (1)x+ b(1)
)
. . .
)
+ b(k−1)
)
+ b(k),
We can further simplify the previous expression as
f (k)(x) = V (k)x + a(k), with V (k) ∈ Rnk×d and a(k) ∈
Rnk given by
V (k) = W (k)
( k−1∏
l=1
Σ(k−l)(x)W (k−l)
)
and
a(k) = b(k) +
k−1∑
l=1
( k−l∏
m=1
W (k+1−m)Σ(k−m)(x)
)
b(l).
The polytope Q(x), the linear region containing x, can
be characterized as an intersection of N =
∑L
l=1 nl half
spaces given by
Γl,i =
{
z ∈ Rd
∣∣∣∆(l)(x)(V (l)i z + a(l)i ) ≥ 0},
for l = 1, . . . , L, i = 1, . . . , nl, namely
Q(x) =
⋂
l=1,...,L
⋂
i=1,...,nl
Γl,i.
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Note that N is also the number of hidden units of the
network. Finally, we can write
f (L+1)(z)
∣∣∣
Q(x)
= V (L+1)z + a(L+1),
which is the affine restriction of f to Q(x).
3. Why ReLU networks produce high
confidence predictions far away from
the training data
With the explicit description of the piecewise lin-
ear classifier resulting from a ReLU type network from
Section 2, we can now formulate our main theorem.
It shows that, as long a very mild condition on the
network holds, for any  > 0 one can always find for
(almost) all directions an input z far away from the
training data which realizes a confidence of 1 −  on
z for a certain class. However, before we come to this
result, we first present a technical lemma needed in the
proof, which uses that all linear regions are polytopes
and thus convex sets.
Lemma 3.1. Let {Qi}Rl=1 be the set of linear regions
associated to the ReLU-classifier f : Rd → RK . For
any x ∈ Rd there exists α ∈ R with α > 0 and t ∈
{1, . . . , R} such that βx ∈ Qt for all β ≥ α.
All the proofs can be found in the appendix. Using
Lemma 3.1 we can now state our first main result.
Theorem 3.1. Let Rd = ∪Rl=1Ql and f(x) = V lx+ al
be the piecewise affine representation of the output of a
ReLU network on Ql. Suppose that V l does not contain
identical rows for all l = 1, . . . , R, then for almost any
x ∈ Rd and  > 0 there exists an α > 0 and a class
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such that for z = αx it holds
efk(z)∑K
r=1 e
fr(z)
≥ 1− .
Moreover, lim
α→∞
efk(αx)∑K
r=1
efr(αx)
= 1.
Please note that the condition that for a region the
linear part V l need not contain two identical rows is
very weak. It is hardly imaginable that this is ever true
for a normally trained network unless the output of the
network is constant anyway. Even if it is true, it just
invalidates the assertion of the theorem for the points
lying in this region. Without explicitly enforcing this
condition it seems impossible that this is true for all
possible asymptotic regions extending to infinity (see
Figure 1). However, it is also completely open how
this condition could be enforced during training of the
network.
Figure 1: A decomposition of R2 into a finite set of polytopes for
a two-hidden layer ReLU network. The outer polytopes extend to
infinity. This is where ReLU networks realize arbitrarily high confi-
dence predictions. The picture is produced with the code of [17].
The result implies that for ReLU networks there
exist infinitely many inputs which realize arbitrarily
high confidence predictions of the networks. It is easy
to see that the temperature rescaling of the softmax,
efk(x)/T∑K
l=1
efl(x)/T
, for temperature T > 0, as used in [24],
will not be able to detect these cases, in particular since
the first step of the method in [24] consists of going in
the direction of increasing confidence. Also it is obvious
that using a reject option in the classifier, see e.g. [3],
will not help to detect these instances either. The result
is negative in the sense that it looks like that without
modifying the architecture of a ReLU network it is im-
possible to prevent this phenomenon. Please note that
from the point of view of Bayesian decision theory the
softmax function is the correct transfer function [21]
for the cross-entropy loss turning the classifier output
fk(x) into an estimate P(Y = k |x, f) = efk(x)∑K
l=1
efl(x)
for
the conditional probability at x.
While the previous result seems not to be known,
the following result is at least qualitatively known [11]
but we could not find a reference for it. In contrast
to the ReLU networks it turns out that Radial Basis
Function (RBF) networks have the property to pro-
duce approximately uniform confidence predictions far
away from the training data. Thus there exist classi-
fiers which satisfy the minimal requirement which we
formulated in Section 1. In the following theorem we
explicitly quantify what “far away” means in terms of
parameters of the RBF classifier and the training data.
Theorem 3.2. Let fk(x) =
∑N
l=1 αkle
−γ‖x−xl‖22 , k =
1, . . . ,K be an RBF-network trained with cross-entropy
loss on the training data (xi, yi)Ni=1. We define rmin =
min
l=1,...,N
‖x− xl‖2 and α = max
r,k
∑N
l=1 |αrl − αkl|. If
3
 > 0 and
r2min ≥
1
γ
log
( α
log(1 +K)
)
,
then for all k = 1, . . . ,K,
1
K
−  ≤ e
fk(x)∑K
r=1 e
fr(x)
≤ 1
K
+ .
We think that it is a very important open problem
to realize a similar result as in Theorem 3.2 for a class
of neural networks. Note that arbitrarily high confi-
dence predictions for ReLU networks can be obtained
only if the domain is unbounded, e.g. Rd. However,
images are contained in [0, 1]d and thus Theorem 3.1
does not directly apply, even though the technique can
in principle be used to produce high-confidence predic-
tions (see Table 2). In the next section we propose a
novel training scheme enforcing low confidence predic-
tions on inputs far away from the training data.
4. Adversarial Confidence Enhanced
Training
In this section we suggest a simple way to adjust
the confidence estimation of a neural network far away
from the training data, not necessarily restricted to
ReLU networks studied in Theorem 3.1. Theorem 3.1
tells us that for ReLU networks a post-processing of the
softmax scores is not sufficient to avoid high-confidence
predictions far away from the training data - instead
there seem to be two potential ways to tackle the prob-
lem: a) one uses an extra generative model either for
the in-distribution or for the out-distribution or b)
one modifies directly the network via an adaptation of
the training process so that uniform confidence predic-
tions are enforced far away from the training data. As
recently problems with generative models have been
pointed out which assign high confidence to samples
from the out-distribution [29] and thus a) seems less
promising, we explore approach b).
We assume that it is possible to characterize a distri-
bution of data points pout on the input space for which
we are sure that they do not belong to the true dis-
tribution pin resp. the set of the intersection of their
supports has zero or close to zero probability mass.
An example of such an out-distribution pout would be
the uniform distribution on [0, 1]w×h (w× h gray scale
images) or similar noise distributions. Suppose that
the in-distribution consists of certain image classes like
handwritten digits, then the probability mass of all im-
ages of handwritten digits under the pout is zero (if it
is really a low-dimensional manifold) or close to zero.
In such a setting the training objective can be writ-
ten as a sum of two losses:
1
N
N∑
i=1
LCE(yi, f(xi)) + λE
[
Lpout(f, Z)
]
, (1)
where (xi, yi)Ni=1 is the i.i.d. training data, Z has dis-
tribution pout and
LCE(yi, f(xi)) = − log
( efyi (xi)∑K
k=1 e
fk(xi)
)
(2)
Lpout(f, z) = max
l=1,...,K
log
( efl(z)∑K
k=1 e
fk(z)
)
. (3)
LCE is the usual cross entropy loss on the original clas-
sification task and Lpout(f, z) is the maximal log con-
fidence over all classes, where the confidence of class l
is given by efl(z)∑K
k=1
efk(z)
, with the softmax function as
the link function. The full loss can be easily minimized
by using SGD with batchsize B for the original data
and adding dλBe samples from pout on which one en-
forces a uniform distribution over the labels. We call
this process in the following confidence enhancing data
augmentation (CEDA). We note that in a concurrent
paper [16] a similar scheme has been proposed, where
they use as pout existing large image datasets, whereas
we favor an agnostic approach where pout models a cer-
tain “noise” distribution on images.
The problem with CEDA is that it might take too
many samples to enforce low confidence on the whole
out-distribution. Moreover, it has been shown in the
area of adversarial manipulation that data augmen-
tation is not sufficient for robust models and we will
see in Section 5 that indeed CEDA models still pro-
duce high confidence predictions in a neighborhood of
noise images. Thus, we propose to use ideas from ro-
bust optimization similar to adversarial training which
[34, 11, 25] apply to obtain robust networks against
adversarial manipulations. Thus we are enforcing low
confidence not only at the point itself but actively min-
imize the worst case in a neighborhood of the point.
This leads to the following formulation of adversarial
confidence enhancing training (ACET)
1
N
N∑
i=1
LCE(yi, f(xi)) + λE
[
max
‖u−Z‖p≤
Lpout(f, u)
]
,
(4)
where in each SGD step one solves (approximately) for
a given z ∼ pout the optimization problem:
max
‖u−z‖p≤
Lpout(f, u). (5)
4
In this paper we use always p = ∞. Note that if the
distributions pout and pin have joint support, the maxi-
mum in (5) could be obtained at a point in the support
of the true distribution. However, if pout is a generic
noise distribution like uniform noise or a smoothed ver-
sion of it, then the number of cases where this happens
has probability mass close to zero under pout and thus
does not negatively influence in (4) the loss LCE on the
true distribution. The optimization of ACET in (4) can
be done using an adapted version of the PGD method
of [25] for adversarial training where one performs pro-
jected gradient descent (potentially for a few restarts)
and uses the u realizing the worst loss for computing
the gradient. The resulting samples are more infor-
mative and thus lead to a faster and more significant
reduction of high confidence predictions far away from
the training data. We use  = 0.3 for all datasets. We
present in Figure 2 and 3 for MNIST and CIFAR-10 a
few noise images together with their adversarial mod-
ification u generated by applying PGD to solve (5).
One can observe that the generated images have no
structure resembling images from the in-distribution.
5. Experiments
In the evaluation, we follow [15, 24, 22] by train-
ing on one dataset and evaluating the confidence on
other out of distribution datasets and noise images. In
contrast to [24, 22] we neither use a different parame-
ter set for each test dataset [24] nor do we use one of
the test datasets during training [22]. More precisely,
we train on MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-
100, where we use the LeNet architecture on MNIST
taken from [25] and a ResNet architecture [13] for the
other datasets. We also use standard data augmenta-
tion which includes random crops for all datasets and
random mirroring for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. For
the generation of out-of-distribution images from pout
we proceed as follows: half of the images are gener-
ated by randomly permuting pixels of images from the
training set and half of the images are generated uni-
formly at random. Then we apply to these images a
Gaussian filter with standard deviation σ ∈ [1.0, 2.5] as
lowpass filter to have more low-frequency structure in
the noise. As the Gaussian filter leads to a contrast re-
duction we apply afterwards a global rescaling so that
the maximal range of the image is again in [0, 1].
Training: We train each model normally (plain),
with confidence enhancing data augmentation (CEDA)
and with adversarial confidence enhancing training
(ACET). It is well known that weight decay alone re-
duces overconfident predictions. Thus we use weight
decay with regularization parameter 5 · 10−4 for all
models leading to a strong baseline (plain). For both
CEDA (1) and ACET (4) we use λ = 1, that means
50% of the samples in each batch are from the orig-
inal training set and 50% are noise samples as de-
scribed before. For ACET we use p = ∞ and  =
0.3 and optimize with PGD [25] using 40 iterations
and stepsize 0.0075 for all datasets. All models are
trained for 100 epochs with ADAM [18] on MNIST
and SGD+momentum for SVHN/CIFAR-10/CIFAR-
100. The initial learning rate is 10−3 for MNIST and
0.1 for SVHN/CIFAR-10 and it is reduced by a fac-
tor of 10 at the 50th, 75th and 90th of the in total
100 epochs. The code is available at https://github.
com/max-andr/relu_networks_overconfident.
Evaluation: We report for each model (plain, CEDA,
ACET) the test error and the mean maximal confi-
dence (for each point this is maxk=1,...,K e
fk(x)∑K
l=1
efl(x)
),
denoted as MMC, on the test set. In order to eval-
uate how well we reduce the confidence on the out-
distribution, we use four datasets on CIFAR-10 [19]
and SVHN [30] (namely among CIFAR-10, CIFAR-
100, SVHN, ImageNet-, which is a subset of ImageNet
where we removed classes similar to CIFAR-10, and
the classroom subset of LSUN [39] we use the ones on
which we have not trained) and for MNIST we eval-
uate on EMNIST [7], a grayscale version of CIFAR-
10 and Fashion MNIST [38]. Additionally, we show
the evaluation on noise, adversarial noise and adver-
sarial samples. The noise is generated in the same
way as the noise we use for training. For adversar-
ial noise, where we maximize the maximal confidence
over all classes (see Lpout(f, z) in (3)), we use PGD
with 200 iterations and stepsize 0.0075 in the  ball
wrt the ‖·‖∞-norm with  = 0.3 (same as in training).
Note that for training we use only 40 iterations, so that
the attack at test time is significantly stronger. Fi-
nally, we check also the confidence on adversarial sam-
ples computed for the test set of the in-distribution
dataset using 80 iterations of PGD with  = 0.3, step-
size 0.0075 for MNIST and  = 0.1, stepsize 0.0025 for
the other datasets. The latter two evaluation modali-
ties are novel compared to [15, 24, 22]. The adversarial
noise is interesting as it actively searches for images
which still yield high confidence in a neighborhood of a
noise image and thus is a much more challenging than
the pure evaluation on noise. Moreover, it potentially
detects an over-adaptation to the noise model used dur-
ing training in particular in CEDA. The evaluation on
adversarial samples is interesting as one can hope that
the reduction of the confidence for out-of-distribution
images also reduces the confidence of adversarial sam-
ples as typically adversarial samples are off the data
manifold [33] and thus are also out-of-distribution sam-
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Noise
Samples
MNIST
Adversarial
Noise
MNIST
for Plain
Figure 2: Top row: our generated noise images based on uniform noise resp. permuted MNIST together with a Gaussian filter and contrast
rescaling. Bottom row: for each noise image from above we generate the corresponding adversarial noise image using PGD with 40 iterations
maximizing the second part of the loss in ACET for the plain model. Note that neither in the noise images nor in the adversarially modified
ones there is structure similar to a MNIST image. For ACET and CEDA it is very difficult to generate adversarial noise images for the fully
trained models thus we omit them.
Noise
Samples
CIFAR-10
Adversarial
Noise
CIFAR-10
for Plain
Adversarial
Noise
CIFAR-10
for CEDA
Adversarial
Noise
CIFAR-10
for ACET
Figure 3: Top row: our generated noise images based on uniform noise resp. permuted MNIST together with a Gaussian filter and contrast
rescaling (similar to Figure 2). Bottom rows: the corresponding adversarial images for the plain, CEDA, and ACET models. Neither the noise
nor the adversarial noise images show similarity to CIFAR-10 images.
ples (even though their distance to the true distribution
is small). Note that our models have never seen ad-
versarial samples during training, they only have been
trained using the adversarial noise. Nevertheless our
ACET model can reduce the confidence on adversarial
samples. As evaluation criteria we use the mean maxi-
mal confidence, the area under the ROC curve (AUC)
where we use the confidence as a threshold for the de-
tection problem (in-distribution vs. out-distribution).
Moreover, we report in the same setting the false pos-
itive rate (FPR) when the true positive rate (TPR) is
fixed to 95%. All results can be found in Table 1.
Main Results: In Table 1, we show the results
of plain (normal training), CEDA and ACET. First of
all, we observe that there is almost no difference be-
tween the test errors of all three methods. Thus im-
proving the confidence far away from the training data
does not impair the generalization performance. We
also see that the plain models always produce relatively
high confidence predictions on noise images and com-
pletely fail on adversarial noise. CEDA produces low
confidence on noise images but mostly fails (except for
MNIST) on adversarial noise which was to be expected
as similar findings have been made for the creation of
adversarial samples. Only ACET consistently produces
low confidence predictions on adversarial noise and
has high AUROC. For the out-of-distribution datasets,
CEDA and ACET improve most of the time the maxi-
mal confidence and the AUROC, sometimes with very
strong improvements like on MNIST evaluated on FM-
NIST or SVHN evaluated on LSUN. However, one ob-
serves that it is more difficult to reduce the confidence
for related tasks e.g. MNIST evaluated on EMNIST or
CIFAR-10 evaluated on LSUN, where the image struc-
ture is more similar.
Finally, an interesting outcome is that ACET reduces
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Trained on
MNIST
Plain (TE: 0.51%) CEDA (TE: 0.74%) ACET (TE: 0.66%)
MMC AUROC FPR@95 MMC AUROC FPR@95 MMC AUROC FPR@95
MNIST 0.991 – – 0.987 – – 0.986 – –
FMNIST 0.654 0.972 0.121 0.373 0.994 0.027 0.239 0.998 0.003
EMNIST 0.821 0.883 0.374 0.787 0.895 0.358 0.752 0.912 0.313
grayCIFAR-10 0.492 0.996 0.003 0.105 1.000 0.000 0.101 1.000 0.000
Noise 0.463 0.998 0.000 0.100 1.000 0.000 0.100 1.000 0.000
Adv. Noise 1.000 0.031 1.000 0.102 0.998 0.002 0.162 0.992 0.042
Adv. Samples 0.999 0.358 0.992 0.987 0.549 0.953 0.854 0.692 0.782
Trained on
SVHN
Plain (TE: 3.53%) CEDA (TE: 3.50%) ACET (TE: 3.52%)
MMC AUROC FPR@95 MMC AUROC FPR@95 MMC AUROC FPR@95
SVHN 0.980 – – 0.977 – – 0.978 – –
CIFAR-10 0.732 0.938 0.348 0.551 0.960 0.209 0.435 0.973 0.140
CIFAR-100 0.730 0.935 0.350 0.527 0.959 0.205 0.414 0.971 0.139
LSUN CR 0.722 0.945 0.324 0.364 0.984 0.084 0.148 0.997 0.012
Imagenet- 0.725 0.939 0.340 0.574 0.955 0.232 0.368 0.977 0.113
Noise 0.720 0.943 0.325 0.100 1.000 0.000 0.100 1.000 0.000
Adv. Noise 1.000 0.004 1.000 0.946 0.062 0.940 0.101 1.000 0.000
Adv. Samples 1.000 0.004 1.000 0.995 0.009 0.994 0.369 0.778 0.279
Trained on
CIFAR-10
Plain (TE: 8.87%) CEDA (TE: 8.87%) ACET (TE: 8.44%)
MMC AUROC FPR@95 MMC AUROC FPR@95 MMC AUROC FPR@95
CIFAR-10 0.949 – – 0.946 – – 0.948 – –
SVHN 0.800 0.850 0.783 0.327 0.978 0.146 0.263 0.981 0.118
CIFAR-100 0.764 0.856 0.715 0.761 0.850 0.720 0.764 0.852 0.711
LSUN CR 0.738 0.872 0.667 0.735 0.864 0.680 0.745 0.858 0.677
Imagenet- 0.757 0.858 0.698 0.749 0.853 0.704 0.744 0.859 0.678
Noise 0.825 0.827 0.818 0.100 1.000 0.000 0.100 1.000 0.000
Adv. Noise 1.000 0.035 1.000 0.985 0.032 0.983 0.112 0.999 0.008
Adv. Samples 1.000 0.034 1.000 1.000 0.014 1.000 0.633 0.512 0.590
Trained on
CIFAR-100
Plain (TE: 31.97%) CEDA (TE: 32.74%) ACET (TE: 32.24%)
MMC AUROC FPR@95 MMC AUROC FPR@95 MMC AUROC FPR@95
CIFAR-100 0.751 – – 0.734 – – 0.728 – –
SVHN 0.570 0.710 0.865 0.290 0.874 0.410 0.234 0.912 0.345
CIFAR-10 0.560 0.718 0.856 0.547 0.711 0.855 0.530 0.720 0.860
LSUN CR 0.592 0.690 0.887 0.581 0.678 0.887 0.554 0.698 0.881
Imagenet- 0.531 0.744 0.827 0.504 0.749 0.808 0.492 0.752 0.819
Noise 0.614 0.672 0.928 0.010 1.000 0.000 0.010 1.000 0.000
Adv. Noise 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.985 0.015 0.985 0.013 0.998 0.003
Adv. Samples 0.999 0.010 1.000 0.999 0.012 1.000 0.863 0.267 0.975
Table 1: On the four datasets MNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100, we train three models: Plain, CEDA and ACET. We evaluate
them on out-of-distribution samples (other image datasets, noise, adversarial noise and adversarial samples built from the test set on which was
trained). We report test error of all models and show the mean maximum confidence (MMC) on the in- and out-distribution samples (lower is
better for out-distribution samples), the AUC of the ROC curve (AUROC) for the discrimination between in- and out-distribution based on
confidence value (higher is better), and the FPR at 95% true positive rate for the same problem (lower is better).
the confidence on adversarial examples, see Figure 4 for
an illustration for MNIST, and achieves on all datasets
improved AUROC values so that one can detect more
adversarial examples via thresholding the confidence
compared to the plain and CEDA models. The im-
proved performance of ACET is to some extent unex-
pected as we just bias the model towards uniform con-
fidence over all classes far away from the training data,
but adversarial examples are still close to the original
images. In summary, ACET does improve confidence
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Plain ACET
MNIST SVHN CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 MNIST SVHN CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
Median α 1.5 28.1 8.1 9.9 3.0 · 1015 49.8 45.3 9.9
% overconfident 98.7% 99.9% 99.9% 99.8% 0.0% 50.2% 3.4% 0.0%
Table 2: First row: We evaluate all trained models on uniform random inputs scaled by a constant α ≥ 1 (note that the resulting inputs
will not constitute valid images anymore, since in most cases they exceed the [0, 1]d box). We find the minimum α such that the models
output 99.9% confidence on them, and report the median over 10 000 trials. As predicted by Theorem 3.1 we observe that it is always possible
to obtain overconfident predictions just by scaling inputs by some constant α, and for plain models this constant is smaller than for ACET.
Second row: we show the percentage of overconfident predictions (higher than 95% confidence) when projecting back the α-rescaled uniform
noise images back to [0, 1]d. One observes that there are much less overconfident predictions for ACET compared to standard training.
Plain CEDA ACET
Figure 4: Histogram of confidence values (logarithmic scale) of adversarial samples based on MNIST test points. ACET is the only model
where a significant fraction of adversarial samples have very low confidence. Note, however that the ACET model has not been trained on
adversarial samples of MNIST, but only on adversarial noise.
estimates significantly compared to the plain model but
also compared to CEDA, in particular on adversarial
noise and adversarial examples. ACET has also a ben-
eficial effect on adversarial examples which is an in-
teresting side effect and shows in our opinion that the
models have become more reliable.
Far away high confidence predictions: Theo-
rem 3.1 states that ReLU networks always attain high
confidence predictions far away from the training data.
The two network architectures used in this paper are
ReLU networks. It is thus interesting to investigate
if the confidence-enhanced training, ACET, makes it
harder to reach high confidence than for the plain
model. We do the following experiment: we take uni-
form random noise images x and then search for the
smallest α such that the classifier attains 99.9% con-
fidence on αx. This is exactly the construction from
Theorem 3.1 and the result can be found in Table 2.
We observe that indeed the required upscaling factor
α is significantly higher for ACET than for the plain
models which implies that our method also influences
the network far away from the training data. This also
shows that even training methods explicitly aiming at
counteracting the phenomenon of high confidence pre-
dictions far away from the training data, cannot pre-
vent this. We also discuss in the appendix a similar
experiment, but with the projection to [0, 1]d.
6. Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that the problem of ar-
bitrarily high confidence predictions of ReLU networks
far away from the training data cannot be avoided even
with modifications like temperature rescaling [12]. It is
an inherent problem of the neural network architecture
and thus can only be resolved by changing the archi-
tecture. On the other hand we have shown that CEDA
and in particular ACET are a good way to reach much
better confidence estimates for image data. CEDA and
ACET can be directly used for any model with lit-
tle implementation overhead. For the future it would
be desirable to have network architectures which have
provably the property that far away from the training
data the confidence is uniform over the classes: the
network knows when it does not know.
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Appendix
A. Proofs
Lemma 3.1. Let {Qi}Rl=1 be the set of linear regions
associated to the ReLU-classifier f : Rd → RK . For
any x ∈ Rd there exists α ∈ R with α > 0 and t ∈
{1, . . . , R} such that βx ∈ Qt for all β ≥ α.
Proof. Suppose the statement would be false. Then
there exist {βi}∞i=1 with βi ≥ 0, βi ≥ βj if i ≤ j and
βi →∞ as i→∞ such that for γ ∈ [βi, βi+1) we have
γx ∈ Qri with ri ∈ {1, . . . , R} and ri−1 6= ri 6= ri+1.
As there are only finitely many regions there exist
i, j ∈ N with i < j such that ri = rj , in partic-
ular βix ∈ Qri and βjx ∈ Qri . However, as the
linear regions are convex sets also the line segment
[βix, βjx] ∈ Qri . However, that implies βi = βj as
neighboring segments are in different regions which
contradicts the assumption. Thus there can only be
finitely many {βi}Mi=1 and the {ri}Mi=1 have to be all
different, which finishes the proof.
Theorem 3.1. Let Rd = ∪Rl=1Ql and f(x) = V lx+ al
be the piecewise affine representation of the output of a
ReLU network on Ql. Suppose that V l does not contain
identical rows for all l = 1, . . . , R, then for almost any
x ∈ Rd and  > 0 there exists an α > 0 and a class
k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} such that for z = αx it holds
efk(z)∑K
r=1 e
fr(z)
≥ 1− .
Moreover, lim
α→∞
efk(αx)∑K
r=1
efr(αx)
= 1.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1 there exists a region Qt with
t ∈ {1, . . . , R} and β > 0 such that for all α ≥ β we
have αx ∈ Qt. Let f(z) = V tz+at be the affine form of
the ReLU classifier f on Qt. Let k∗ = arg max
k
〈vtk, x〉,
where vtk is the k-th row of V t. As V t does not contain
identical rows, that is vtl 6= vtm for l 6= m, the maximum
is uniquely attained up to a set of measure zero. If the
maximum is unique, it holds for sufficiently large α ≥ β〈
vtl − vtk∗ , αx
〉
+ atl − atk∗ < 0, ∀l ∈ {1, . . . ,K}\{k∗}.
(6)
Thus αx ∈ Qt is classified as k∗. Moreover,
efk∗ (αx)∑K
l=1 e
fl(αx)
= e
〈vtk∗ ,αx〉+atk∑K
l=1 e
〈vtl ,αx〉+atl (7)
= 1
1 +
∑K
l 6=k∗ e
〈vtl−vtk∗ ,αx〉+atl−atk . (8)
By inequality (6) all the terms in the exponential are
negative and thus by upscaling α, using 〈vtk∗ , x〉 >
〈vtl , x〉 for all l 6= k∗, we can get the exponential term
arbitrarily close to 0. In particular,
lim
α→∞
1
1 +
∑K
l 6=k e
〈vtl−vtk∗ ,αx〉+atl−atk = 1.
Theorem 3.2. Let fk(x) =
∑N
l=1 αkle
−γ‖x−xl‖22 , k =
1, . . . ,K be an RBF-network trained with cross-entropy
loss on the training data (xi, yi)Ni=1. We define rmin =
min
l=1,...,N
‖x− xl‖2 and α = max
r,k
∑N
l=1 |αrl − αkl|. If
 > 0 and
r2min ≥
1
γ
log
( α
log(1 +K)
)
,
then for all k = 1, . . . ,K,
1
K
−  ≤ e
fk(x)∑K
r=1 e
fr(x)
≤ 1
K
+ .
Proof. It holds efk(x)∑K
r=1
efr(x)
= 1∑K
r=1
efr(x)−fk(x)
. With
|fr(x)− fk(x)| =
∣∣∑
l
(αrl − αkl)e−γ‖x−xl‖22
∣∣ (9)
≤ e−γr2min
∑
l
|αrl − αkl| (10)
≤ e−γr2minα ≤ log(1 +K), (11)
where the last inequality follows by the condition on
rmin. We get
1∑K
r=1 e
fr(x)−fk(x)
≥ 1∑K
r=1 e
|fr(x)−fk(x)|
(12)
≥ 1
Keαe
−γr2min
(13)
≥ 1
K
1
1 +K ≥
1
K
− , (14)
where we have used in the third inequality the condi-
tion on r2min and in the last step we use 1 ≥ (1−K)(1+
K) = 1−K22. Similarly, we get
1∑K
r=1 e
fr(x)−fk(x)
≤ 1∑K
r=1 e
−|fr(x)−fk(x)|
≤ 1
Ke−αe
−γr2min
≤ 1
K
(1 +K) ≤ 1
K
+ .
This finishes the proof.
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B. Additional α-scaling experiments
We also do a similar α-scaling experiment, but
with the projection to the image domain ([0, 1]d box),
and report the percentage of overconfident predictions
(higher than 95% confidence) in Table 2, second row.
We observe that such a technique can lead to over-
confident predictions even in the image domain for the
plain models. At the same time, on all datasets, the
ACET models have a significantly smaller fraction of
overconfident examples compared to the plain models.
C. The effect of Adversarial Confidence
Enhanced Training
In this section we compare predictions of the plain
model trained on MNIST (Figure 5) and the model
trained with ACET (Figure 6). We analyze the im-
ages that receive the lowest maximum confidence on
the original dataset (MNIST), and the highest max-
imum confidence on the two datasets that were used
for evaluation (EMNIST, grayCIFAR-10).
Evaluated on MNIST: We observe that for both
models the lowest maximum confidence corresponds to
hard input images that are either discontinous, rotated
or simply ambiguous.
Evaluated on EMNIST: Note that some hand-
written letters from EMNIST, e.g. ’o’ and ’i’ may look
exactly the same as digits ’0’ and ’1’. Therefore, one
should not expect that an ideal model assigns uniform
confidences to all EMNIST images. For Figure 5 and
Figure 6 we consider predictions on letters that in gen-
eral do not look exactly like digits (’a’, ’b’, ’c’, ’d’).
We observe that the images with the highest maximum
confidence correspond to the handwritten letters that
resemble digits, so the predictions of both models are
justified.
Evaluated on Grayscale CIFAR-10: This
dataset consists of the images that are clearly distinct
from digits. Thus, one can expect uniform confidences
on such images, which is achieved by the ACET model
(Table 1), but not with the plain model. The mean
maximum confidence of the ACET model is close to
10%, with several individual images that are scored
with up to 40.41% confidence. Note, that this is much
better than for the plain model, which assigns up to
99.60% confidence for the images that have nothing
to do with digits. This result is particularly interest-
ing, since the ACET model has not been trained on
grayCIFAR-10 examples, and yet it shows much better
confidence calibration for out-of-distribution samples.
D. ROC curves
We show the ROC curves for the binary classifi-
cation task of separating True (in-distribution) im-
ages from False (out-distribution) images. These cor-
respond to the AUROC values (area under the ROC
curve) reported in Table 1 in the main paper. As stated
in the paper the separation of in-distribution from out-
distribution is done by thresholding the maximal con-
fidence value over all classes taken from the original
multi-class problem. Note that the ROC curve shows
on the vertical axis the True Positive Rate (TPR), and
the horizontal axis is the False Positive Rate (FPR).
Thus the FPR@95%TPR value can be directly read off
from the ROC curve as the FPR value achieved for 0.95
TPR. Note that a value of 1 of AUROC corresponds to
a perfect classifier. A value below 0.5 means that the
ordering is reversed: out-distribution images achieve
on average higher confidence than the in-distribution
images. The worst case is an AUROC of zero, in which
case all out-distribution images achieve a higher confi-
dence value than the in-distribution images.
D.1. ROC curves for the models trained on MNIST
In the ROC curves for the plain, CEDA and ACET
models for MNIST that are presented in Figure 7, the
different grades of improvements for the six evaluation
datasets can be observed. For noise, the curve of the
plain model is already quite close to the upper left cor-
ner (which means high AUROC), while for the mod-
els trained with CEDA and ACET, it actually reaches
that corner, which is the ideal case. For adversarial
noise, the plain model is worse than a random classi-
fier, which manifests itself in the fact that the ROC
curve runs below the diagonal. While CEDA is better,
ACET achieves a very good result here as well.
D.2. ROC curves for the models trained on SVHN
CEDA and ACET significantly outperform plain
training in all metrics. While CEDA and ACET per-
form similar on CIFAR-10, LSUN and noise, ACET
outperforms CEDA clearly on adversarial noise and ad-
versarial samples.
D.3. ROC curves for the models trained on
CIFAR-10
The ROC curves for CIFAR10 show that this
dataset is harder than MNIST or SVHN. However,
CEDA and ACET improve significantly on SVHN. For
LSUN even plain training is slightly better (only time
for all three datasets). However, on noise and adver-
sarial noise ACET outperforms all other methods.
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Plain model:
lowest max
confidence on
MNIST
Plain model:
highest max
confidence on
EMNIST
Plain model:
highest max
confidence on
grayCIFAR-10
1 with 37.58% 1 with 39.72% 7 with 40.49% 7 with 40.54% 5 with 43.31% 9 with 45.73% 1 with 47.86%
0 with 100.0% 0 with 100.0% 6 with 100.0% 6 with 100.0% 0 with 100.0% 0 with 100.0% 0 with 100.0%
2 with 99.60% 2 with 99.13% 7 with 98.99% 6 with 98.83% 2 with 98.76% 7 with 98.65% 6 with 98.48%
Figure 5: Top Row: predictions of the plain MNIST model with the lowest maximum confidence. Middle Row: predictions of the plain
MNIST model on letters ’a’, ’b’, ’c’, ’d’ of EMNIST with the highest maximum confidence. Bottom Row: predictions of the plain MNIST
model on the grayscale version of CIFAR-10 with the highest maximum confidence. Note that although the predictions on EMNIST are mostly
justified, the predictions on CIFAR-10 are overconfident on the images that have no resemblance to digits.
ACET model:
lowest
maximum
confidence on
MNIST
ACET model:
highest
maximum
confidence on
EMNIST
ACET model:
highest
maximum
confidence on
grayCIFAR-10
1 with 26.80% 1 with 35.73% 3 with 36.21% 7 with 36.83% 3 with 38.00% 3 with 38.91% 2 with 39.86%
2 with 100.0% 6 with 100.0% 2 with 99.99% 6 with 99.99% 6 with 99.99% 6 with 99.99% 0 with 99.99%
0 with 40.41% 4 with 38.24% 0 with 36.13% 0 with 34.91% 0 with 34.37% 0 with 33.58% 7 with 32.36%
Figure 6: Top Row: predictions of the ACET MNIST model with the lowest maximum confidence. Middle Row: predictions of the ACET
MNIST model on letters ’a’, ’b’, ’c’, ’d’ of EMNIST with the highest maximum confidence. Bottom Row: predictions of the ACET MNIST
model on the grayscale version of CIFAR-10 with the highest maximum confidence. Note that for the ACET model the predictions on both
EMNIST and grayCIFAR-10 are now justified.
D.4. ROC curves for the models trained on
CIFAR-100
Qualitatively, on CIFAR-100, we observe the same
results as for CIFAR-10. Note that the use of the confi-
dences to distinguish between in- and out-distribution
examples generally works worse here. This might be
attributed to the fact that CIFAR-100 has consider-
ably more classes, and a higher test error. Therefore,
the in- and out-distribution confidences are more likely
to overlap.
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Plain CEDA ACET
Figure 7: ROC curves of the MNIST models on the evaluation datasets.
Plain CEDA ACET
Figure 8: ROC curves of the SVHN models on the evaluation datasets.
E. Histograms of confidence values
As the AUROC or the FPR@95%TPR just tell us
how well the confidence values of in-distribution and
out-distribution are ordered, we also report the his-
tograms of achieved confidence values on the original
dataset (in-distribution) on which it was trained and
the different evaluation datasets. The histograms show
how many times the maximum confidence for test im-
ages have certain values between minimal possible 0.1
(0.01 for CIFAR-100) and maximal possible 1.0. They
give a more detailed picture than the single numbers
for mean maximum confidence, area under ROC and
FPR@95% TPR.
E.1. Histograms of confidence values for models
trained on MNIST
As visible in the top row of Figure 11, the confi-
dence values for clean MNIST test images don’t change
significantly for CEDA and ACET. For FMNIST, gray
CIFAR-10 and Noise inputs, the maximum confidences
of CEDA are generally shifted to lower values, and
those of ACET even more so. For EMNIST, the
same effect is observable, though much weaker due to
the similarity of characters and digits. For adversar-
ial noise, both CEDA and ACET are very success-
ful in lowering the confidences, with most predictions
around 10% confidence. As discussed in the main pa-
per, CEDA is not very beneficial for adversarial images,
while ACET slightly lowers its confidence to an average
value of 85.4% here.
E.2. Histograms of confidence values for models
trained on SVHN
Figure 12 shows that both CEDA and ACET as-
sign lower confidences to the out-of-distribution sam-
ples from SVHN house numbers and LSUN classroom
examples. CEDA and ACET, as expected, also signf-
icantly improve on noise samples. While a large frac-
tion of adversarial samples/noise still achieve high con-
fidence values, our ACET trained model is the only one
that lowers the confidences for adversarial noise and
adversarial samples significantly.
E.3. Histograms of confidence values for models
trained on CIFAR-10
In Figure 13, CEDA and ACET lower significantly
the confidence on noise, and ACET shows an improve-
ment for adversarial noise, which fools the plain and
CEDA models completely. For CIFAR-10, plain and
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Plain CEDA ACET
Figure 9: ROC curves of the CIFAR-10 models on the evaluation datasets.
Plain CEDA ACET
Figure 10: ROC curves of the CIFAR-100 models on the evaluation datasets.
CEDA models yield very high confidence values on ad-
versarial images, while for ACET model the confidence
is reduced. Additionally, on SVHN, we observe a shift
towards lower confidence for CEDA and ACET com-
pared to the plain model.
E.4. Histograms of confidence values for models
trained on CIFAR-100
In Figure 14, we see similar results to the other
datasets. It is noticable in the histograms that for
adversarial noise, the deployed attack either achieves
100% confidence or no improvement at all. For CEDA,
the attack succeeds in most cases, and for ACET only
rarely.
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Dataset Plain CEDA ACET
MNIST
FMNIST
EMNIST
Gray
CIFAR-10
Noise
Adversarial
Noise
Adversarial
Samples
Figure 11: Histograms (logarithmic scale) of maximum confidence values of the three compared models for MNIST on various evaluation
datasets.
Dataset Plain CEDA ACET
SVHN
CIFAR-10
CIFAR-100
LSUN
Classroom
Imagenet
minus C10
Noise
Adversarial
Noise
Adversarial
Samples
Figure 12: Histograms (logarithmic scale) of maximum confidence values of the three compared models for SVHN on various evaluation
datasets.
Dataset Plain CEDA ACET
CIFAR-10
SVHN
CIFAR-100
LSUN
Classroom
Imagenet
minus C10
Noise
Adversarial
Noise
Adversarial
Samples
Figure 13: Histograms (logarithmic scale) of maximum confidence values of the three compared models for CIFAR-10 on various evaluation
datasets.
Dataset Plain CEDA ACET
CIFAR-100
SVHN
CIFAR-10
LSUN
Classroom
Imagenet
minus C10
Noise
Adversarial
Noise
Adversarial
Samples
Figure 14: Histograms (logarithmic scale) of maximum confidence values of the three compared models for CIFAR-100 on various evaluation
datasets.
